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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article presents a critique of unpaid "parental" leaves and
the parental leave legislation recently passed by Congress.1 Eight states
have already enacted parental leave statutes of various kinds.' For the
*

Assistant Professor, DePaul College of Law. A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Yale Law

School. The author would like to thank Jacob Corre, Keith N. Hylton, Jane Rutherford, and N.
Morrison Torrey who commented helpfully on prior drafts of this Article. Also, participants in
faculty workshops at Cornell, Pittsburgh and lIT Chicago-Kent law schools were particularly

helpful in critiquing several of the ideas developed in this paper. Charles Dyke, Christine Reidy,
and Robin Kaplan provided excellent research assistance. This Article was supported generously
by the Dean's Research Fund of the DePaul College of Law. Of course, all the usual disclaimers

about errors and opinions apply.
1. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990 was passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate. H.R. 770, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H2239-40 (daily ed. May
10, 1990); 136 CONG. REC. 58007 (daily ed. June 14, 1990). Generally, the measure would entitle
employees to take 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for a newborn, adopted, or seriously ill family
member, or to provide for the employee's own health in times of serious illness. Although the leave
would be without pay, employers would be required to maintain the employee's medical benefits
and to offer the employee the same or an equivalent position upon return. For a more detailed
analysis of the bill, see infra Section II(A).
Several states have, during the last decade, begun to mandate that employers provide parental leave to employees who qualify. See infra note 2. For a quantitative analysis of the state
programs, see 9To5, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WORKING WOMEN, NEW WORKFORCE POLICIES
AND THE SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR: Is FAMILY LEAVE GOOD FOR BUSINESS? (1988). See also
O'Brien & Madek, Pregnancy Discriminationand Maternity Leave Laws, 93 DICK. L. REV. 311
(1989); Sugarman, Short Term PaidLeave: A New Approach to Social Insurance and Employee
Benefits, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1987); Note, ParentalLeave: An Investment In Our Children, 26
J. FAM. L. 579 (1988).
2. Four states permit employees to take unpaid family and medical leave with job and benefits security. These are Connecticut: Act Concerning Family and Medical Leave From Employment, 1989 Conn. Acts 89-382 (Reg. Sess.) (West Supp. 1990) (providing employees of firms with
250 or more employees 16 weeks of unpaid leave every two years); Maine: Family Medical Leave
Requirements Act of 1987, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 843-849 (1988) (granting employees
of companies with more than 25 employees eight weeks of unpaid leave every two years) (originally scheduled to sunset in 1990, the law has been permanently enacted, 1990 ME. LEGIS. SERV.
ch. 738); New Jersey: Family Leave Act, 1989 N.J. Laws 261 (granting employees of firms with
100 or more employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave every two years); Wisconsin: Family or Medical
Leave Act, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 103.10 (West Supp. 1989) (providing employees of companies with
50 or more employees six weeks of unpaid leave every year for birth or adoption of a child and
two weeks every year for the illness of a family member).
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sake of simplicity and uniformity, however, this Article focuses on the
proposed federal legislation 3 and its anticipated effects on unemployed
and underemployed women.4 Specifically, this Article argues that the
debate about parental leave 5 has ignored the possibility that the cost of
this mandated benefit is likely to be borne by poor, low-skill working
women 6 who will find that their job opportunities narrow as employers
try to shift some of the costs of the benefit to employees.
Three states grant employees unpaid parental leave in conjunction with the birth or adoption
of a child while retaining job and benefits security. These are Minnesota: Parenting Leave Act of
1987, MINN. STAT. §§ 181.940-.944 (Supp. 1990) (permitting employees in companies with 21 or
more employees to take up to six weeks of leave); Oregon: Parental Leave Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 659.360-659.370 (1989) (employees in firms with 25 or more employees may take up to 12
weeks of leave immediately following the adoption or birth of child); Rhode Island: Parental
Leave Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-2 (Supp. 1989) (employees in firms with 50 or more employees are entitled to 13 weeks of leave in two years).
In Washington, the Parental Leave Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.12.270 (1990), requires employers to permit employees to use accrued sick leave to care for a sick child.
3. On July 25, 1990, the House of Representatives failed to override a veto of the Family
Medical Leave Act by President Bush. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1990, at A16, col. 1. However,
immediately following the veto, several of the bill's supporters indicated that they intended to
reintroduce substantially similar legislation as soon as possible. For example, Senator Dodd said,
"George Bush is going to have a family leave bill on his desk every year he is in office." Id.
4. Throughout this Article, and for reasons discussed below, the term "poor women" is used
to refer to females of working age who would like to be employed but cannot find work, or who
are working at jobs that do not enable them to maintain themselves and their families above the
poverty threshold.
"Poverty threshold" refers to the official income figures used by the Bureau of the Census to
estimate the number of families living in poverty. In 1988, the poverty threshold for a family of
four was $12,091; for one person it was $6,024. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-60, No. 166, ADVANCE

REPORT ON IN-

COME AND POVERTY 5 (1989).

5. In analyzing the desirability of parental leave legislation, no attempt is made here to
evaluate the related problem of women's relatively low wages and the oft-cited solution of comparable worth. For a discussion of comparable worth, see Fischel & Lazear, Comparable Worth and
Discriminationin Labor Markets, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 891 (1986); Holzhauer, The Economic
Possibilitiesof Comparable Worth, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (1986); Weiler, The Wages of Sex:
The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728 (1986); Comment, Pay
Equity or Pay Up: The Inevitable Evolution of Comparable Worth into Employer Liability
Under Title VII, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 305 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Pay Equity or Pay Up].
6. In spite of the fact that the statute is written in sex-neutral terms and refers to parenting
and not mothering, there are several reasons for believing that female employees and would-be
employees are likely to be disproportionately harmed by the legislation, not the least of which is
that experience under employer-provided leave programs has demonstrated that women take advantage of the leave opportunity far more often than men. See, e.g., Parentaland Medical Leave
Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, Part I, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 386
(1987) ("[W]e have had a couple of major employers in Connecticut . . . that have leave programs, but the experience of men taking advantage of it is fractional. . . . [A] tiny fraction of the
percentage of the men in their work force take leave.") (statement of Sen. Dodd); CATALYST,
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The typical response to this concern is that sex discrimination in
the workplace is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 It is true that section 2000e-2(a) makes it unlawful for an
employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,

or priviledges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . .. ; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's . . . sex ...
It is also true that Title VII was amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") in 19788 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy,' childbirth, or related conditions. Therefore, an employer
must treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees
unless it can establish a business necessity or BFOQ defense. Neither
Title VII nor the PDA, however, is effectively able to deter all instances of sex or pregnancy discrimination. Because there is a large
supply of essentially fungible low-skill employees, 1" mandated parental
leaves will encourage employers to choose a prospective male employee
over a female candidate where all other costs of employee benefits are
equal. Additionally, in many instances, poor women, even if they are
fortunate enough to be working, will be unable to take full advantage
of the statute because the mandated leave is unpaid. The working
women most likely to benefit will be those in relatively high-wage,
high-skill jobs. Finally, job opportunities (and lifestyles) of the vast
majority of working men will be unaffected by the parental leave provisions in the legislation, 1 because studies indicate that men rarely take
REPORT ON A NATIONAL STUDY OF PARENTAL LEAVES

26-39 (1986);

NATIONAL FOUNDATION

FOR THE STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT POLICY, THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR COSTS OF PROPOSED

& n.4 (1988) [hereinafter The Nathan Study];
Klein, Missed Work and Lost Hours, May 1985, 109 MONTHLY LAB. REV. Nov. 1986, at 26.
This, and other reasons are dealt with in detail in Section III, infra.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
10. For a discussion of the dimensions and characteristics of the low-skill labor pool in the
United States, see generally D." PARSONS, POVERTY AND THE MINIMUM WAGE (1980).
11. The recently passed version of the leave legislation entitles employees to take time off
from work to care for a newborn or newly adopted child, care for an ill family member, or care for
the worker's own illness. This Article focuses primarily on the provision allowing time off to care
for a newborn or newly adopted child.
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE LEGISLATION 25-26
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advantage of parenting leaves.12 This Article examines parental leave
in terms of the economic costs it will impose, costs which have largely
been ignored by participants in the political debate about the proposed
legislation.
The Article considers several of the arguments that have surfaced
during the debate over whether protective legislation generally is helpful to women workers. Specifically, Section II contains a description of
the proposed statute and evaluates the arguments of both supporters
and detractors. Section III analyzes the parallels between the proposed
legislation and another example of intervention in the labor market-the minimum wage.' s Section III also discusses the costs and expected wage and employment effects on low-skill workers of the legisla-

14
tion. Section IV reviews the "formal equality"/"special treatment"'
debate that is well known in the feminist legal literature, and concludes
that neither set of arguments addresses the problem of intra-gender in-

equality highlighted by the proposed legislation.
II.
A.

WHAT IS A "PARENTAL" LEAVE?

Mechanics of Parental Leave
"Parental Leave" refers to the Family and Medical Leave Act of

1990, which passed in the House of Representatives on May 10,
12. See supra note 6.
13. On April 1, 1990, the legal minimum wage was increased from $3.35 an hour to $3.80
an hour. The legal minimum will increase again on April 1, 1991, to $4.25 an hour. For the first
time, however, employers will be able to pay a subminimum training wage, set at 85 % of the legal
minimum, to employees under the age of 20 for a maximum of 90 days. The subminimum is
scheduled to sunset in April 1993. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206 (1988), Pub. L. No. 101-157, 103 Stat. 938 (1989).
14. The "special treatment" vs. "equal treatment" argument has actually generated three
distinct positions with respect to the desirability of mandated employee benefits. The first is that
"special treatment" is necessary in order to compensate for the unique function of pregnancy that
women bear. See, e.g., Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, I BEARK. WOMEN'S
L.J. 1 (1985); Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981). A second
group of feminists have argued that protective legislation creates more disadvantages than advantages for women and accounts for the ghettoization of women into certain jobs and the attendant
low pay. See, e.g., Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985) [hereinafter Williams,
Equality's Riddle]. Another group of feminists have argued that what is required is a broad
conception of equality that extends beyond short, unpaid leaves and provides maximum flexibility
for both men and women who work and have small children or ill family members. See, e.g., Fisk,
Employer-Provided Child Care Under Title VII: Toward an Employer's Duty to Accommodate
Child Care Responsibilities of Employees, 2 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1986); Minow, Rights For
the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1986).
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1990,15 and in the Senate on June 14, 1990.1 Support for the bill in
Congress largely has followed party lines, with Democrats in favor and

Republicans opposed. 17 On June 29, President Bush kept his promise to
veto the measure when it was sent to the White House. 18

In 1985 Representative Patricia Schroeder (Democrat, Colo.) introduced the first Parental and Disability Leave Act. 19 After several

interim appearances, 2 0 the bill returned in 1989 as The Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1989 with-more than 150 cosponsors, 2' and was
finally adopted in the House of Representatives in compromise form by

a vote of 237 to 187.22 Senator Christopher J. Dodd (Democrat, Conn.)
introduced a companion bill in the Senate,23 which was reintroduced
with twenty cosponsors in 1989.24 The bill was reported from the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee in July 1989, but was
dropped in favor of the House version on June' 14, 1990.21
The Act has been significantly revised since its debut in 1985.

Originally, the House measure called for eighteen work-weeks of biannual unpaid leave for employees to care for the birth, adoption or serious illness of a child, and twenty-six work-weeks of annual unpaid disa-

bility leave.

6

A later version excluded from coverage employees in

firms with fewer than fifteen workers,

7

a figure that was subsequently

8

increased to fifty employees. In its most recent form, the bill would
permit employees with at least twelve months and one thousand hours
of service in companies that employ fifty or more workers to take up to
twelve work-weeks of unpaid leave within any twelve-month period in
15. H.R. 770, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H2239-40 (daily ed. May 10, 1990).
16. H.R. 770, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S8007 (daily ed. June 14, 1990).
17. See 136 CONG. REc. H2239-2240 (daily ed. May 10, 1990) (roll call of vote on H.R.
770).
18. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
19. H.R. 2020, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
20. It was reintroduced as The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, H.R. 4300, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), and then reappeared again as The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1987, H.R. 925, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
21. H.R. 770, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
22. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,.136 CONG. REc. H223840 (daily ed. May 10, 1990).
23. S. 249 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
24. S. 345 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
25. S. REP. No. 77, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990), 136 CONG. REC. 8006-08 (daily ed.
June 14, 1990).
26. H.R. 2020, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102-03 (1985).
27. H.R. 925, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 102 (1987).
28. H.R. 770, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1989).
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order to care for a newborn, adopted, or seriously ill family member, or
to provide for the employee's own health in times of serious illness.2 9
The bill also would protect the employee's position and benefits during
the leave, including the employer-paid portion of health care insurance.3 0 In addition, the Act would create a commission to investigate
the legislation's costs, benefits and potential impact on productivity,
and to make recommendations on whether businesses with fewer than
fifty employees should be covered."1
The latest Senate version would have permitted an employee in a
company with twenty or more employees to take ten work-weeks of
leave every two years to care for a newborn, adopted, or seriously ill
family member and thirteen work-weeks of annual leave to care for the
employee's own health. 2 The Senate bill also would have protected the
employee's position and benefits during the absence.3 3 A number of
states have adopted parental leave laws with varying degrees of similarity to the proposed federal legislation. 4
B.

Who Supports ParentalLeave?

Support for Parental Leave has created an unusual coalition of
organizations, including labor unions, women's rights groups, branches
of the Catholic Church, and the Association of Junior Leagues. 5 Because a great deal of the controversy about parental leave focuses on its
potential costs and the possibility of discrimination against women employees, many proponents have addressed these issues. For example, in
April 1987 Professor Eleanor Holmes Norton, testifying in the House
in support of the statute on behalf of a large group of women's organi29. H.R. 770, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-02, 136 CONG. REc. H2224-25 (daily ed. May
10, 1990).
30. Id. at § 104.
31. Id. at §§ 301-02.
32. S. 345 §§ 103-04, S. REP. No. 77, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989).
33. Id. at § 106.
34. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
35. The statute is also supported, inter alia, by the American Association of Retired Persons, the ACLU, the Urban League, the Pro-Life Office of the Archdiocese of Boston, the American Federation of Teachers, the National Organization for Women, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the Women's Legal Defense Fund, Service Employees International Union, the
Association of Flight Attendants, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, and the National Women's Political Caucus.
Indeed, with the exception of business and manufacturing groups, it is hard to find any or-

ganization that has declared itself opposed to the proposed legislation. A careful review of the
testimony submitted both in favor of and against the Act suggests that every major women's
organization is in favor.
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zations, unions and several religious groups went so far as to describe
the Act as "a no-cost benefit" that employers could easily provide. 6 In

May 1986, a representative from the Women's Legal Defense Fund
argued before another House committee that the bill would avoid the
hazard of job discrimination against women.
Faced with the knowledge that job-protected leaves were Tequired for working
mothers and working mothers only, employers would very likely be reluctant to
hire or promote women of child-bearing age. Under the proposed legislation,
however, because employers would be required to provide job-protected leaves for
all employees in circumstances that affect them all approximately equally, they
would have no incentive to discriminate against women.7

Not surprisingly, the primary argument against the statute has

come from organized business 8 which, in the name of increased cost,
purports to worry about increased discrimination against female em-

ployees. The Chamber of Commerce, for example, has taken the position that mandated benefits of any kind tend to reduce an employer's
ability to offer other, possibly more desirable, benefits and thereby limit

employee choice. 9 In addition, the Chamber has argued that the most

"pro-family" policy of all is one which encourages job creation, not one

which mandates benefits and increases the relative cost of labor for employers. With respect to the argument that women will not suffer discrimination because the Act provides that both men and women may

take leaves, the Chamber points out that
[e]quality of treatment for working women is preferable to mandating special treatment for women with family responsibilities-the latter being what Cal-

36. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 925 Before the Subcomm.
on Civil Service and the Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House

Comm. on the Post Office and Civil Service, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 31 (1987) (statement of
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter Norton Statement].
37. Parentaland Medical Leave Act of 1986: Hearingson H.R. 4300 Before the Subcomm.
on Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm.

on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 108-09 (1986) (written statement of Women's
Legal Defense Fund) (footnotes omitted).
38. The Chamber of Commerce has testified on several occasions against the legislation, as
have the American Subcontractors Association, the Department of Justice, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Business, the National Restaurant
Association, the National School Boards Association, and various small business groups.
39. The Family And Medical Leave Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor
Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Educa-

tion and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1987) (statement of Virginia Lamp, Labor Relations
Attorney, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Statement].
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ifornia law and most other nations most often provide. Although technically this
legislation applies to men and women, we all realize that women have tended to
to
assume the vast majority of family responsibilities. This stereotype is likely
40

have an adverse impact on working women if this legislation becomes law.

The issues of potential cost and the likelihood of discrimination

against women employees are closely linked. If it is true, as the Chamber asserts, that women may still be targets for discrimination because
they will take disproportionate advantage of the leave policy, then the
extent of the discrimination will, in all likelihood, be determined by just
how costly employers expect the Act to be. In other words, if Professor
Norton is correct and the benefit can be provided without cost, the issue of discrimination should not arise. The problem, though, is that the
leave policy will not be cost-free. In addition to estimates prepared by
the General Accounting Office ("GAO"), which suggest that the Act
will cost employers something, one has to assume that a cost-free benefit is one that employers would already be providing.41
In 1987, the GAO prepared estimated costs of both the House and
Senate versions of the statute. The House bill at that time would have
permitted employees to take up to ten weeks of unpaid leave over a
two-year period in connection with the birth, adoption, or serious illness
of a child or parent and up to fifteen weeks every two years for their
own illness. It would have guaranteed the same or equivalent job upon
return and required employers to continue paying for the leave taker's
health benefits. For employers with fifty or more employees, the GAO
estimated the cost to be about $188 million annually."2 For employers
with between thirty-five and forty-nine employees, the estimated cost
was $212 million annually.4' These figures did not include the cost of
replacing workers on leave because the GAO concluded:
we believe there will be little, if any, measurable net cost to employers associated
with replacing workers or maintaining current levels of output ....
While some
disruption occurred as a result of work reallocation or the hiring of temporary

40. Id. at 111-12.
41. Indeed, given the amount of time and other resources that organized business has thus
far devoted to defeating the Family and Medical Leave Act, it is only reasonable to assume that
employers are quite confident that the benefit cannot be offered at zero cost. Under the circumstances, this confidence does not appear to be misplaced.
42.
OF

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PARENTAL LEAVE ESTIMATED COSTs

H.R. 925,
43. Id.

THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF

1987, at 1 (Nov. 1987).
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workers, the firms
also experienced savings in that no wages had to be paid to the
44
absent workers.

The GAO's estimate for the 1987 Senate version of the Act, which
provided job protection and continued health insurance benefits for employees who took up to eighteen weeks of leave at firms with fifteen or
more employees,4 5 was $500 million annually. Again, the GAO concluded that actual replacement costs would be insignificant.
In contrast, the Chamber of Commerce's 1987 estimate of the
costs of the Senate bill differed significantly. The Chamber assumed
that the total cost of the parental leave provisions would include continued health insurance, the increased cost of replacing workers on leave,
government administrative expenses, employer regulatory costs and
paperwork, and lost productivity associated with the shift away from
more experienced employees. These combined costs were estimated to
be more than $16 billion. Unlike the GAO, the Chamber assumed that
the most significant costs would be the cost of hiring temporary
replacements and the lower productivity of those replacements.4
Whether one prefers the GAO's methodology (which excludes the
cost of replacements) or that of the Chamber of Commerce, what is
clear is that.under no circumstances is the Act cost-free. The concern,
then, about possible discriminatory reactions from employers toward
female employees is well placed. If women employees take a disproportionate number of the parenting leaves, 47 employers will tend to associate the extra cost with these employees.
In spite of the possibility of increased discrimination against female employees, supporters of the Act do not appear to have given the
issue any systematic treatment." This potential problem, which has
been articulated by organized business, has largely been brushed aside,
44. Id. at 1-2.
45. S. 249, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102-03 (1987).
46. See Chamber of Commerce Statement, supra note 39, at 108-09.
47. See supra note 6.
48. The crux of the problem is that, as evidenced by its list of supporters, the Act is
designed to enable female employees to balance the demands of work and family more effectively
without the risk of job loss. For a variety of reasons, however, supporters do not wish to design
legislation that speaks in sex-specific terms to this problem. See infra Section IV. The result is an
attempt to finesse the discrimination issue by ignoring that experience with employer-provided
parental leave policies suggests that it is women who almost always take advantage of these policies. See supra note 6. No one can seriously maintain that the statute providing that a man could
legally take a leave is likely to cause him to do so, especially in light of the persistent wage-gap,
see infra note 76, which, in addition to societal norms, encourages women to forego their incomes.
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along with concerns about the cost of the legislation, as a feigned expression of concern disguised to hide a solidly anti-regulatory agenda.4
While it may be true that organized business has other, less admirable
reasons for raising the question of discrimination, this does not make
the issue any less important in light of the expected increase in the cost
of labor.
C.

The Politics of Parental Leave

How can one explain the persistent support for this legislation by
women's groups in spite of the specter of discrimination against female
employees? Perhaps the reason is that the expected discrimination
(avoidance by employers of female workers) is likely to affect only the

low-wage segment of the female labor market, rather than women employees generally. The theoretical and empirical issues surrounding the
adverse effect of increased labor costs on low-wage workers is treated

at length in Section III of this Article.
With respect to the politics of parental leave, however, suffice it to
say that support for the bill persists in spite of strong evidence that
poor women may face reduced job opportunities as employers seek to
find ways to reduce the new, increased costs.50 This persistence can
only be explained by the class bias of organized women's groups.5" This
49. This is evidenced by the following excerpts.
SENATOR DODD: But your real objection to this-the real objection-is the mandated
nature of it. Am I basically hitting the problem on the head?
FRANCES SHAINE [Chairman of Council on Small Business U.S. Chamber of Commerce]: Yes, [that is] the underlying real problem.
Parentaland Medical Leave Act of 1987: Hearingson S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on Children,
Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources Part I,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1987).
[Tihe way the legislation is written there's been testimony that it will discourage the hiring
of women of childbearing years. [N]o one has pointed out that men can be the father of
children from early on until their 80s and 90s. . . .[Thus] the father will be able to take
off time, and certainly in this situation who can know when you hire a gentleman whether
or not that individual is going to be the parent of a child [and take advantage of mandated
parental leave].
So that's an issue that tends to be raised as being discriminatory against women, and I
would suggest a suspicious argument.
Id. Part II, at 48 (statement of Ann Aiken, Attorney, Thorp & Dennet).
50. This conclusion remains valid whether one relies on the GAO estimates or those prepared by the Chamber of Commerce.
51. The manifestation of class bias by organizations that claim to speak for all women
should come as no surprise to those who have followed, for example, the development of the abortion debate in the years since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). On June 30, 1980, the United
States Supreme Court decided Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and upheld the Hyde
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point is not novel; others have argued that organizations which ostensibly speak for women generally have failed to articulate effectively the

concerns of poor women.5 2 The class bias is simply easy to see in the
case of parental leave, where the concerns of relatively skilled working
women are at odds with those of lower-skill female employees.
III.

A.

PAYING FOR "PARENTAL" LEAVE:
ANALYSIS

A MINIMUM WAGE-BASED

The Minimum Wage Model and Parental Leave

Labor markets are affected, directly or otherwise, by a wide variety of factors, including government regulations mandating employee
benefits.5 3 For policymakers, then, the issue is not whether any particuAmendment, which restricts federal funding of abortions to cases where the mother's life is in
danger or where the pregnancy was caused by rape or incest. The effect of Harriswas to make it
virtually impossible for poor women to pay to legally abort their unwanted fetuses. (McRae, the
named plaintiff in this class action suit, was a Medicaid recipient.) The hue and cry over Harris,
however, was trivial when compared with the outpouring of anger and concern over the Supreme
Court's more recent opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989),
which many informed observers believe may be the first step toward the overturning of Roe and
the elimination of a federally guaranteed right to abortion. See, e.g., Rasky, March is Planned on
Abortion Right, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1989, at A16, col. 1 (march on Washington planned by
National Organization for Women to protest Webster decision); N.Y. Times, July 5, 1989, at
A17, col. 1 ("'[W]e will launch an equal force against state legislatures to chip away at Roe.'"
(quoting Randall Terry, National Director of Operation Rescue)); Gross, Goaded by Ruling,
Groups Plot State-by-State Plan to Keep Abortion Rights, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1989, at A17, col.
1 (" 'Why is it that gun owners are so politically powerful? There are more uterus owners than
gun owners. And when uterus owners begin.to vote this issue, we will win.'" (quoting Polly Rothstein, director of Coalition for Legal Abortion, on the need to mobilize women in both political
parties)); Toner, Right to Abortion Draws Thousands to 'Capital Rally, N.Y. Times, April 10,
1989, at Al, col. 6 (300,000 demonstrators march to show concern over pending Webster case).
Abortion activists themselves concede that since 1989, Webster has catalyzed pro-choice
women's organizations for the first time since Roe. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 23, 1989, at A25,
col. 3 (" 'The women who have come of age since 1973 expect the right to legal birth control and
abortion. They finally understand the threat.'" (quoting Molly Yard, President of the National
Organization for Women)). This is true even though poor women have effectively been denied the
right to abort their fetuses since 1980. In other words, abortion rights became a major concern of
pro-choice groups only when the rights of relatively wealthy women were threatened. See L.
TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 177-91 (1990).
52. See generally Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUTSIDER 114 (1984); Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 201.
See also E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT

(1988).
53. See, e.g., Sawhill, Rethinking Employment Policy, in RETHINKING EMPLOYMENT POLICY 9 (D. Bawden & F. Skidmore eds. 1989). See also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
GOVERNMENT MANDATING OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

(1987).
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lar mandated benefit-be it a legal minimum wage,5 health insurance,
or parental leave-will have an effect on employment, but whether the
effect is justified by the anticipated gain the benefit represents. Mandated benefits are not new and neither is the debate over their desirability. 5 Economists, for example, have done a tremendous amount of
research on the effects of the legal minimum wage, which was first introduced in the 1930s."
The basic concern with any mandated benefit is that employers
will attempt to find ways to reduce or pass on the additional costs incurred in having to provide that benefit. To the extent that an employer
can pass on the costs to the ultimate consumer of her product, the em57
ployment effect of the benefit is thought to be small.
54. The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") requires employers to pay the prevailing legal
minimum wage. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 &
Supp. 1989). The minimum wage for adult workers is $3.80 per hour and will rise to $4.25 on
April 1, 1991. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (Supp. 1989). Youths under the age of 20 may be paid a
training wage for 90 days equal to 85% of the adult minimum. The FLSA is in many respects an
anti-poverty statute: "The Congress finds that the existence. . . of labor conditions detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to
be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among workers of the several States ...
It is declared to be the policy of this [Act] . . .to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above referred to . . .without substantially curtailing employment or earning
power." 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
In spite of its anti-poverty aims, the minimum wage "makes a very modest contribution to the
alleviation of poverty." B. FLEISHER, MINIMUM WAGE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 75
(1983). Moreover,
[tihe costs of minimum wage legislation . . . substantially outweigh the modest benefits, if
any, that can be claimed by supporters of the minimum wage. Indeed, labor demand elasticities for minimum wage workers are so large that it is very doubtful a case can be made
that minimum wages have raised their average earnings."
Id. at 76.
55. See Part Five Policy Forum Discussion. Are Mandated Benefits a New Notion? EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GOVERNMENT MANDATING OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

306

(1987).
56. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp.
1989).
57. See figure 1. Only when an employer is faced with an inelastic (very steeply sloped)
demand curve for her goods will she be able to pass on to consumers (by increasing the price) the
entire increase in cost without any loss of output.
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Figure 1. (All costs passed on to consumers)
Economists, however, believe that passing on the entire increased cost
is not always possible.5 8
58. See figure 2. Here, the supply curve shifts upward (to supply) reflecting an increase in
the effective wage of covered workers; and the demand curve for labor shifts upward to reflect an
increase in the price of the employer's output.
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Figure 2. (Employment effect when all costs are passed on to
consumer).
Indeed, experience with the minimum wage suggests that employers

have altered hiring,59 and training"0 behavior, at least for low-skill
employees.
Every time Congress considers increasing the legal minimum
wage, the debate over the effects of the minimum wage on low-skill
workers is reignited. 8" Although supporters, most notably organized labor, 2 decline to focus on it, there is considerable empirical evidence
59. F. WELCH, MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE 34-38 (1978).
60. See M. HASHIMOTO, MINIMUM WAGES AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING (1981).
61.

See Rasky, Veto of Wage Bill Withstands Vote, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1989, at A21,

cal. 1; Rasky, The Minimum-Wage Fight Isn't Really About Pay, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1989, § 4,
at 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at A26, col. 1.
62. One commentator has speculated that it may be "a desire to raise the relative price of
unskilled nonunion labor, which may substitute for skilled union labor" that motivates organized
labor's perennial support for increases in the minimum wage. Kniesner, The Low-Wage Workers:
Who Are They?, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES 467 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1981).

1991]

PARENTAL LEAVE

suggesting that employment opportunities for low-skill workers are reduced with each increase.6" What happens is that an employer, faced
with a rising cost for labor, 4 substitutes away from labor and in favor
of capital to the extent that substitution is possible.6 8 Where substitution is not possible and the added cost cannot be passed on to consumers, the real rate of employment is reduced. 6
The direct effects of minimum wages are obvious. When an employer is faced
with a legal minimum wage, if it exceeds the contribution of some employees to
the firm's revenue, the firm can either lay these persons off or "subsidize" their
employment. Moreover, as the firm's demand for labor increases through time it
will probably forego hiring some persons it otherwise would have hired, because
hiring them would require a subsidy. On balance, we would therefore expect ag-

gregate employment to be reduced by the introduction of a legal wage floor. 67

Additionally, Professor Linneman has noted:
Economists have often speculated that the strong and continuing support given to minimum
wage laws by labor unions is primarily motivated by the benefits which these laws bestow
on union members. This is not to say that union spokesmen do not believe the lofty social
ideals they espouse at congressional hearings but, rather, that their primary concern is the
welfare of their constituency, namely, union members. The ... [table] indicate[s] that
union members gained substantially from the presence of a minimum wage law ....
Linneman, The Economic Impacts of Minimum Wage Laws: A New Look at an Old Question, 90
J. POL. EcON. 443, 463 (1982).

63. R. KRUMM, THE IMPACT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON REGIONAL LABOR MARKETS 61
(1981) ("Since the early 1960s more and more types of employment opportunities have become
subject to the national legislated wage floor. This trend has severely restricted the employment
and earning opportunities of lower-skill workers in the market economy, not allowing for alternative sources of employment for these workers."); B. FLEISHER, supra note 54, at 63-64 (1983)
("The preponderance of evidence is that the economy-wide and industry-specific disemployment
effects of minimum wages on all minimum wage workers . . . is to reduce average earnings, contrary to the intent of [the Fair Labor Standards Act].") (emphasis in original).
64. Employee benefits, because they are paid to employees, must be included with wages in
the calculation of total labor cost.
65. For a general discussion of the principle of substitution, see R. LIPSEY, P. STEINER & D.
PURVIS, ECONOMICS 198-99 (1984).

The minimum wage affects different groups of workers in different ways. There is evidence,
for example, that black workers (male and female) have experienced a larger disemployment effect than white workers. "The demographic groups for whom the long-term income effects [of the
minimum wage] are the most positive are white males and females." Behrman, Sickles & Taub-

man, The Impact of Minimum Wages on the Distributions of Earnings for Major Race-Sex
Groups: A Dynamic Analysis, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 766, 775 (1983). "Most important, generally
the changes in the [minimum wage] have benefitted the more schooled relative to the less schooled
....
Id. at 776. "Thus, we agree that federal minimum wage policy on net probably has not
been good policy." Id.
66. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REv., May
1989, at 177, 181. See also W. WESSELS, MINIMUM WAGES, FRINGE BENEFITS AND WORKING
CONDITIONS (1980).
67. Kosters & Welch, The Effects of Minimum Wages By Race, Sex and Age in RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 109 (A. Pascal ed. 1972).
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Economists refer to a labor market restricted by a legal minimum
wage as one with "wage rigidities.""a The presence of wage rigidities is
likely to increase the employment displacement effects of other man-

dated benefits. 9 Once the new mandated benefit rule takes effect, an

employer who is already forced to pay a wage that nearly equals the

anticipated productivity of an employee is likely to face a new total
wage bill that exceeds productivity.
Legal wage minimums and other forced increases in the cost of
labor have their most marked effect on low-wage (i.e., low-skill) employees because the incremental cost of these mandated benefits repre-

sents such a relatively large portion of the total cost of employing the
lowest paid employees.7 0 In other words, an individual with little training and few marketable skills who can contribute only $2.50 per hour
to the workplace is effectively precluded from employment by a legal

minimum that requires an employer to offer him at least $4.25 per
hour. Because the putative employee can offer only $2.50 per hour

worth of services, it makes no sense for an employer to employ her at
1
7

$4.25 per hour.
If one adds to the hourly wage bill a requirement that an employer
provide other benefits without regard to employee productivity, the result is more extreme. The "costs" of parental leave legislation would

include the health insurance premiums an employer must continue to
pay, the expense of hiring a temporary replacement, lost productivity,

paperwork in connection with leaves, and expected litigation costs incurred in connection with disputes over "equivalent jobs" upon return.
68. Id. In the absence of wage rigidities, mandated benefits could be traded for lower wages.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JL. &. EcoN. 1 (1960).
69. Kosters & Welch, supra note 67, at 109.
70. "Among other welfare-related programs designed for transfers from the haves to the
have-nots, minimum wages are perverse. They design transfers from some have-nots to other havenots." F. WELCH, MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE 44 (1978).
[Blear in mind the nature of this transaction. We first impose a law that results in job
losses. For those who lose their jobs and then find that they qualify for welfare, there is
partial compensation. Is it not strange that at a time when a major concern of welfare
programs is to increase work incentives we also push a minimum wage program which
reduces work?
id. at 44-45.

71.

See, e.g., R. POSNER,

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw

309-10 (1986) ("The unemployment

effects of the minimum wage are substantial and are concentrated among marginal workers. ...
The fixing of a minimum wage has no effect on the demand for workers whose marginal productivity is high and who therefore receive a free-market wage above the minimum wage; the disemployed are those whose marginal productivity is lower, or perceived as lower, than the minimum
wage.").

19911

PARENTAL LEAVE

Suppose that the added cost of providing parental leave is ten cents per
hour. The same employer now must consider whether to offer employment at a cost of $4.35 per hour to an individual whose productivity
remains at $2.50 per hour. The chances of obtaining employment are
further reduced as the gap between labor cost and productivity
widens. 72 The result is that low-skill individuals face a shrinking pool of
labor market opportunities as the cost of employing them increases
without an attendant increase in their ability to contribute to the workplace. Moreover, out of work, they are effectively cut off from all employee benefits because an "obvious problem with mandated benefits is
that they only help those with jobs."78
The minimum wage model that has been developed by economists
anticipates a reduction in employment for low-skill employees that increases as the legal minimum wage increases. This model can be successfully adapted to evaluate the proposed parental leave legislation by
making several basic assumptions. First, rather than focus on low-skill
workers generally, the adapted model considers low-skill female labor
because "the expected cost of parental leave is greater for women than
men." 4I Experience under voluntary employer-provided parental leave
regimes suggests that women employees will take advantage of this
benefit far more often than will men employees.7 5 (Note that although
the proposed statute is written in sex-neutral terms, there is nothing in
the legislation that would encourage men to take a parental leave. Indeed, given the persistence of the "wage gap" 7 between the earnings of
male and female employees, one would expect that, when a choice exists, women will continue to opt to take an unpaid leave more frequently than men because the relative income loss will be less signifi72. Kosters & Welch, supra note 67, at 109-10.
73. Summers, supra note 66, at 181.
74. Id. at 181-82.
75. See supra note 6.
76. Women are estimated to earn between 64 cents and 72 cents for every dollar that men
earn. See, e.g., Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's Work: Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE L.J. 1397, 1398 n.5 (1988) (citing WOMEN'S
BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LEAFLET No. 88-2, FACTS ON WOMEN
WORKERS 2 (1988), for the statistic that full-time, year-round female workers earn 65 cents for
every dollar earned by men); Comment, Pay Equity or Pay Up, supra note 5, at 306 n.l (the
wage differential in 1986 was 64.3% according to BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACT SHEET ON CIVILIANS 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER WORKING YEAR ROUND, FULL

TIME (ALL RACES) (1987)); Chavez, Pay Equity is Unfair to Women, FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 1985, at
161 (women earn 72 cents for every dollar that men earn); Rhode, Occupational Equality, 1988
DUKE LJ. 1207 ("[W]omen of working age in biblical times were valued at thirty silver shekels
and men at fifty. After 2,000 years [the end of the 19 7 0s], that ratio had not changed.").
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cant.) 7 7 The second assumption required for adaptation is that parental
leave costs something. Although estimates vary substantially-with the
business lobby anticipating the highest figures 78 -both supporters and
detractors of the legislation agree that, regardless of the version which
ultimately gains congressional approval, the bill will force employers to
bear some additional cost.7 9 The third and final assumption is that, as
77. See San Francisco Examiner, June 14, 1984, at C12, col. 1 ("Men generally do not take
the [parenting] leaves in the first place, probably because they make more money than their wives
and the couple would have more to lose financially."); Labor Letter, Wall St. J., July 19, 1988, at
Al, col. 5 ("'Here in the South,' says an official [of Ryder Corp.], 'taking paternity leave is
something that a man simply wouldn't consider doing.' "). See also M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 54 (1987) ("In the United States ...
maternity leave tends to be
available mainly to full-time women workers with good jobs."); Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1184 n.117 (1988).
78. The Chamber of Commerce, for example, predicted that the Senate version of the bill
would cost employers and the economy more than $27 billion. Parentaland Medical Leave, 1987:
Hearings on S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, Part I, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-07 (1987)
(statement of Frances Shaine, Chairman of Council of Small Business, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). The GAO, on the other hand, predicted that the same bill would cost employers at most
$500 million per year. Id. Part II, at 469 (statement of William J. Gainer, Associate Director of
Human Resources Division, GAO). When S. 249 was amended to cover employees in firms with
20 or more workers (instead of 15 workers in the original version) and the length of leave reduced,
the GAO revised its cost estimates to $194 million annually. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PARENTAL LEAVE: ESTIMATED COST OF REVISED PARENTAL AND MEDICAL LEAVE

ACT 1 (1988).

Similarly, Robert R. Nathan Associates analyzed the potential cost of H.R. 925 for the National Foundation for the Study of Employment Policy and determined that the bill would cost
employers between $191 million and $311 million during the first year it became operational.
NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR THE STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR COSTS OF PROPOSED FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE LEGISLATION, Tables 2A, 3A, 3C, 4A,

5A, 5C (1988). The cost estimates for the first year in the Nathan Study vary according to the
assumptions made. Compare id. (the figures in Tables 2A, 3A, 4A and 5A (assuming no
mandatory health care legislation is passed) with id., the figures in Tables 2B, 3B, 4B and 5B
(assuming mandatory health care legislation is passed)).
The National Federation of Independent Business estimates that the cost to individual employers will be $2,474 per employee for an 18-week parental leave and $3,573 for a 26-week
medical leave. Parental Leave: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1987) (statement of John Motley I1, Director of Federal Government Relations, National Federation of Independent Business).
79. Even one of the act's strongest supporters agrees that the bill will have some measurable
impact on employers, although the association argues that it will be considerably less than what
the Chamber of Commerce estimates it to be. Family and Medical Leave, 1987: Hearings on
H.R. 925 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor
Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1987)
(statement of Karen Nussbaum, Executive Director, 9to5, National Association of Working
Women).
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profit maximizers, employers will rationally seek to avoid incurring extra costs whenever they can do so.
A minimum wage regime, standing alone, tends to reduce the employment opportunities of low-skill women (presumably in the same
proportions as for low-skill men). As Figure 3 demonstrates, however, a
combined parental leave/minimum wage regime (which is what employers will face if the legislation becomes law) further reduces the employment opportunities of low-skill women because employers will expect that female employees will opt for the benefit whereas male
employees will tend not to do so.80 Moreover, if the workforce participation of women continues to rise, these costs will increase as well.
The cost of providing some employees with parental leave will be
borne by low-skill female employees who lose their jobs or fail to obtain
employment because of the increased wage bill faced by the employer.
Precisely how many low-skill women will be affected will depend on the
actual cost of the legislation and the slope of the demand curve for lowskill female labor.8 "
80. Women may also incur additional costs under the legislation because "[t]he overwhelming majority [over 60 percent] of low-wage workers are women, with about 40 percent of them
aged twenty-five to sixty-four." Kniesner, The Low-Wage Workers: Who Are They?, in THE EcoNOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES 471 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1981). This Article does not address
the effects of mandated benefits on uncounted women workers, such as domestics and babysitters,
who do not participate formally in the workforce because they are paid in cash or for other reasons are not counted among the working. Any decrease in employment opportunities for women
generally, however, also reduces the employment prospects of those, such as domestics and babysitters, whose "uncounted" work is a function of the absence of a full-time mother at home.
81. See Figure 3. The imposition of parental leave, in combination with a minimum wage
floor, clearly exacerbates the latter's negative employment effect for low-wage/low-skill female
labor. This can be seen by comparing the distance a to b with the distance c to b in Figure 3.
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NEGATIVE EFFECT ON LOW WAGE/LOW SKILL
FEMALE LABOR UNDER MINIMUM WAGE REGIME
AND PARENTAL LEAVE REGIME
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Figure 3. Quantity of low-wage/low-skill female labor where:
Q

= Equilibrium quantity of low-wage/low-skill female labor
hired.

Q'

= Quantity of low-wage/low-skill female labor hired under
minimum wage regime.

Q-'

= Quantity of low-wage/low-skill female labor hired under
minimum wage and parental leave regime.
= Decreased demand for low-wage/low-skill female labor
after imposition of parental leave regime.

D"°

a b = Amount of excess supply of
labor under minimum wage
c b = Amount of excess supply of
labor under minimum wage

low-wage/low-skill female
regime.
low-wage/low-skill female
and parental leave regime.
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No attempt is made here to sort out the competing cost claims made by
the bill's supporters and detractors.8 2 What is important is that all
agree that the bill is not cost-free. Consequently, some kind of negative
employment effect, even if only a small one, should be expected.
B.

Empirical Evidence: The 9to5 Study

Support for parental leave is strong and varied.8 It is therefore
not surprising that some efforts have been made empirically to assess
state parental leave regimes to allay the fears of the business community on the question of cost. Unfortunately, although these efforts may
reassure those who are concerned with overall job growth, they do not
address the issue, raised by the adapted minimum wage model, of reduced employment opportunities for low-skill women. Neither is this
particularly surprising. Support for mandated parental leaves has come
overwhelmingly from organizations preoccupied with the concerns of
middle and upper-middle class women."' Although it is not inconceivable that these groups could also articulate the needs of poor women, it
is not to be expected where, as here, the interests of high- and low-skill
women employees so dramatically diverge. The 9to5 study, with its one
reference to "women of color" (read: "poor and low-skill") is typical of
the treatment that poor women's issues receive both in the legal academic literature and from feminist groups.8a
A popular device that, unfortunately, has the tendency to obscure
the very real distinctions and interests between different classes of
women is to lump "women and minorities" or "blacks and women" together for purposes of discussing subordination. 6 The problem has not
82. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 35. The National Commission on Working Women, for example, recently issued a report in which they recommended, inter alia, increases in the federal minimum
wage and implementation of parental leave policies as solutions to "improv[e] conditions for working poor women." THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON WORKING WOMEN, No WAY OUT: WORKING
POOR WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (May 1988).
84. See supra Section II.
85. See, e.g., Delgado & Leskovac, The Politics of Workplace Reforms: Recent Works on
Parental Leave and A Father-Daughter Dialogue, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1031, 1035 (1988)
("Voydanoff warns, however, that few studies have focused on the effects of current trends on
minority populations . . . as most investigators have studied white middle class families.").
86. See, e.g., Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle:Applications, 3 WIs. WOMEN's L.J.
59, 59 n.l (1987) ("By referring to the subordination of blacks and women throughout this article, I do not mean to suggest that these are the only groups that have faced subordination.");
Note, Rethinking Weber: The Business Response to Affirmative Action, 102 HARV. L. REV. 658,
658 (1989) ("Over the course of twenty-three years, the attitudes of businesses toward preferential employment policies for minorities and women have evolved dramatically."); Silver, The Uses
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been limited to legal academic circles. As the economist Rhonda M.
Williams has noted, there is a similar "tendency in orthodox economics
...[in that] much neoclassical discourse suggests all the women are
white and all the blacks are men."' s
In 1988, 9to5, National Association of Working Women,88 prepared an econometric study on the effect of mandated parental leave on
small business growth, using data from states with mandated leave policies.8 9 At the outset, the study acknowledges that
[t]he small business community has resisted [mandated parental leave]
fiercely .... To analyze this concern, we studied the effect of state-level family

leave policies on the growth of jobs in the small business sector, with startling
results: minimum family leave policies did not hurt job growth in the small business sector. In fact, family leave policies are strongly associated with small business job growth ....90

In reaching this conclusion, the authors of the study compared
small business job growth in seven of twenty-one states that have some
form of parental leave policy in place9 ' with small business job growth
in seven so-called "pro-business" states. 92 They found that small busiand Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO.WASH. L. REv.
482, 491 (1987) ("There is no question that the 1964 [Civil Rights] Act and its progeny have
been responsible for major improvements in the plight of women, minorities, and the handicapped
in this nation."); Comment, Comparable Worth, DisparateImpact, and the Market Rate Salary
Problem: A Legal Analysis and Statistical Application, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 730, 730 (1983)
(" 'Comparable worth' represents the concept that men, women, minorities, and whites should
receive equal pay for work of equal value to their employer."); Clark, The Future Civil Rights
Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. UL. REV.795, 822
(1989) ("Macroeconomic data tends to show a continuing wide disparity between the incomes of
white males as compared to women and minorities who have been traditionally subjected to
discrimination.").
For a critique of what she calls the "ampersand problem" (as in "women & minorities"), see
E. SPELMAN, supra note 52, at 114-32.
87. R. WILLIAMS, BEYOND HUMAN CAPITAL: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES 1 (Wellesley College Center for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 183, 1988).
88. 9to5, National Association of Working Women describes itself as "a membership group
of office workers which combines research, education, and activism to win better working conditions-rights and respect-for the nation's 20 million office workers."
89. 9To5, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WORKING WOMEN, NEW WORKFORCE POLICIES AND
THE SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR: Is FAMILY LEAVE GOOD FOR BusINESS? A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1988) [hereinafter 9TO5 STUDY].
90. Id.
91. The seven states were California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, and Washington.
92. The "pro-business" states were Indiana, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Dakota,
Florida, Missouri, and Nebraska.
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ness employment grew more rapidly in the parental leave states. They
also determined, however, that small business employment is encouraged by "anti-regulationist" 93 fiscal policies, such as low taxes and
minimal government expenditures on welfare, unemployment and disability. Therefore, they conclude that there are "two diametrically opposed policy approaches that are both associated with small business
expansion." 9 As one might expect, 9to5 ultimately opts for the "regulationist" approach because "[i]t is in the social interest to support policies which guarantee family and medical leave. . . . These policies
have the least cost to workers . . . when they are implemented on the
federal level." 9 5
At first glance, it appears that the 9to5 study may lay to rest
many of the concerns raised in this Article about the possibility of reduced employment opportunities for poor women as a result of mandated parental leave. Nonetheless, a careful review of the data and the
techniques employed by the study's authors suggests otherwise. First
and possibly most important, and in spite of a passing reference to the
fact that "[w]omen of color are proportionally most likely to be among
the working poor,""' the study does not attempt to consider the nature
of the job growth it has associated with parental leave policies. Specifically, the study does not examine the employment patterns of low-skill
women workers. In order to address the concerns raised by the adapted
minimum wage model, we must develop a test that looks at the employment of low-skill women before and after the adoption of legislation
mandating parental leave provisions. This test should compare the employment patterns of low-skill women with the employment patterns of
other groups of workers to determine how (and whether) they have
shared in the job growth the authors identify. It is entirely possible, for
example, that the small business job growth the study tracks represents
job growth for high-skill, well-paid labor. Although there is certainly
nothing wrong with job growth in general, or high-skill job growth,
neither is it necessarily related to improved employment opportunities
9
for the very poorest employees. 7
The second problem with the study is one of causation. It is possi93.
94.
95.
96.

9TO5 STUDY, supra note 89, at vi.
Id. at vii.
Id. at ix.
Id. at 11.

97. The claims of the study could easily be tested by obtaining data on employment growth
of poor women in parental leave states and comparing the growth rate before and after the legislation was introduced, holding steady as many other factors as possible.
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ble that the presence of mandated parental leave in the seven states
studied may itself have been caused by positive job growth." It is unlikely that any mandated benefits measure would have been politically
successful in a state experiencing a local recession with its attendant
increase in unemployment. Rather, a tight labor market and expanding
job growth may have caused employers to support, or at least acquiesce
to, passage of parental leave legislation and other mandated benefits as

a way to attract and retain hard-to-find employees." Thus, one cannot
conclude, as the 9to5 study does, that parental leave policies are "good

for job growth." 100 Moreover, even if they are good for job growth generally, this conclusion is not inconsistent with the possibility that mandated leave policies may be disastrous for job growth for low-skill
women.

The analysis must focus on the employment prospects of low-skill
women, not on employment growth generally. In the same way that the

minimum wage has drawn attention to low-skill workers, mandated
benefits, including parental leave, need to be evaluated in terms of their
cost to poor women. Many employers already offer parental leave more

generous than that being considered by Congress to high-skill men and
women, 10 1 which ought to heighten concern for those with few or no
skills.
98.

This is known in the econometrics literature as the problem of simultaneity. See, e.g., G.

MADDALA, ECONOMETRICS

220-42 (1977).

99. This was certainly true of the debate within the business community over the 1989
increase in the federal minimum wage, which came at a time when many statehouses were also
considering proposals to increase state minimum wages. While most businesses were opposed to
any increase in the minimum wage on principle, the legislation's strongest opponents were from
regions of the country (especially the South) where the labor supply was plentiful. In large cities
and some regions of the country where a tight labor market had driven the cost of labor above the
mandated minimum wage, many businesses were either ambivalent about the increase or anxious
not to risk the potentially negative publicity that would attend public opposition to a largely superfluous increase.
100. 9ro5 STUDY, supra note 89, at iv.
101. In a report prepared by Catalyst, a research group, the authors found that part-time
workers frequently receive no parental leave benefits, even when the benefits are available to
other, full time employees. In addition, the authors learned that managerial employees frequently
are allowed more generous terms than nonmanagers when trying to negotiate part-time work.
CATALYST, REPORT ON A NATIONAL STUDY OF PARENTAL LEAVES 33, 54 (1986). Catalyst's report suggests that employers are prepared to extend more favorable treatment to highly skilled,
relatively more valuable employees. This is consistent with the negative employment scenario the
adapted minimum wage model indicates.
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C.

Elaboration of Costs Associated with Employment Effects

On June 29, 1990, President Bush vetoed the Family and Medical
Leave Act.'" 2 Although the veto seems to have killed the legislation this
session, Democrats may attempt to override the President or resurrect
the bill next session. Even if Congress is successful in either attempt,
the veto may delay implementation long enough to permit some empirical testing of the 9to5 conclusions with an emphasis on job growth for
poor women. Perhaps supporters of mandated leaves will continue to
back the legislation, even in the face of data suggesting that the leaves
could reduce employment opportunities for poor women. In that case
the choices will be clear and the agenda unmuddled.
If the negative employment effect is small should we continue to
be concerned? Congress has already demonstrated a willingness to tolerate the negative employment effect of the minimum wage on teenagers. 10 Why are low-skill workers, particularly women, different?
The answer lies in the composition of the low-skill workforce in
this country and in the numerous other costs associated with chronic
unemployment. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in 1989,
the total official rate of unemployment for men and women was 5.3 %.
For adult white men (20 and over) the rate was only 4.5 %; for adult
white women (20 and over) the rate was also 4.5%. In contrast, the
unemployment rates for adult black men and women were 11.5 % and
11.4%, respectively. 10 4 The significant difference in the black and white
rates of unemployment is fairly common knowledge; what may be less
well known, however, is that
the official jobless rate doesn't come close to representing the true extent of unemployment in America. In addition to the 6.5 million people officially jobless in
June [1988], 5.3 million people wanted full-time work but only found part-time
employment, and 910,000 "discouraged" workers dropped out of the labor force.
When involuntary part-time workers and those who have given up looking for
work altogether are considered the real rate of unemployment was an unaccept102. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
103. "As expected, minimum wages are estimated to have a destabilizing effect upon teenagers and a stabilizing effect on adults. In a sense, minimum wages seem to shift much of the
burden of variation in aggregate employment from adults to teenagers, from males to females,
from whites to nonwhites; in each case the destabilizing effect is upon those with lower average
wages." Kosters & Welch, supra note 67, at 112-13. See also R. LIPSEY, P. STEINER & D. PURVIS,
ECONOMICS 362 (1984).
104. BUREAU OF LABOR

STATISTICS,

U.S.

BLES, UNEMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (1990).

DEP'T OF LABOR,

1989

ANNUAL AVERAGE TA-
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ably high 10.4%. The ratio of the real to official unemployment rate has increased due to the growth of involuntary part-time employment.1 05

Thus, the real black rate of unemployment may be as high as
20%.101 This means that as many as one in every five black men and
women (adults, not teenagers) who want to work cannot find a fulltime job. One must add to this extremely high rate of joblessness a
,plethora of other costs generated by low rates of employment. Public
assistance, unemployment compensation, food stamps, and other taxpayer supported programs are only the most obvious costs associated
with high unemployment and its attendant poverty.
High crimes rates, property destruction, violent physical attacks,
and a variety of health problems are all well known characteristics of
locations with low rates of full-time employment. 10 7 In New York City,
for example, the 1980 census figures indicate that median family income was $16,818. In Harlem, a very poor, largely African-American
and Hispanic area with a high unemployment rate, the average family
income was a mere $9,102.101 In certain neighborhoods in Chicago, the
sociologist William Julius Wilson has found similar high rates of unemployment, coupled with serious crime, welfare dependency, and low income levels.109
High rates of unemployment in African-American neighborhoods o create problems in addition to the obvious ones associated with
low income. There is, for example, the relationship between joblessness
105.

UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS; THE RESEARCH BULLETIN

8 (Summer 1988) (em-

phasis in original).
106. Analyzing the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Annual Average Tables for 1989, one discovers that by adding to the 1,544,000 officially unemployed the 262,000 discouraged workers and
749,000 nonvoluntary part-time workers, the total number of blacks unemployed is 2,555,000, or
19.2% of the 13,497,000 black Americans. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
1989

ANNUAL AVERAGE TABLES, UNEMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (1990).

107. See generally W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQUALITY 9, 23-37 (1985); Terry, In Harlem, Death is an Old and Busy
Neighbor, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (noting correlation between a variety of health
problems, low employment rate, high crime rates and widespread poverty in Harlem, New York).
108. See N.Y. Times, supra note 107, at A36, col. 1 (chart).
109. See W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); W. WILSON, THE DECLINING
SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978).

110. Obviously, not all low-skill female employees are African American. African Americans and Hispanics, however, are disproportionately represented among the ranks of the unskilled.

See

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (1990).

1989

ANNUAL AVERAGE TABLES, UN-
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and marital instability that Professor Wilson has treated at length.1 1
Additionally, unemployment exacerbates a variety of other social
problems that are manifested by single-parent families. Specifically,
there is evidence suggesting that, unlike white women, black women
face "a shrinking pool of economically stable . . . men. This . . .supports the hypothesis that the rise of black female-headed families is
directly related to increasing black male joblessness." ' Thus, black
women are more likely to be the sole source of support for their children, as black men find it harder and harder to obtain employment.11 8
The solution is not, of course, to focus exclusively on the tremendous employment needs of black women. (The economic fates of black
men and women are intertwined; 4 improved economic status for men
would almost certainly lead to improved status for women and their
children.) Nevertheless, given the already dire economic straits many
low-skill black (and Hispanic) women find themselves in, we should
think long and hard about a proposal that may tend to further shrink
their already limited employment opportunities. Piecemeal attempts to
deal with particular employment problems, such as how to accommodate workers with small children and sick family members, will only
result in reduced employment opportunities for the most vulnerable
participants (or would-be participants) in the workforce.
IV.

A.

PAYING FOR "PARENTAL"

LEAVE: OTHER, NON-QUANTIFIABLE
COSTS

Protectionist Legislation and the Rise of "Separate Spheres"
The debate about parental leave has focused, to an extent, on the

desirability of protectionist legislation for women workers. Although
the economic costs to women workers are hard to quantify with precision at this time, they are far easier to grapple with than some of the
other, nonquantifiable costs associated with mandated parental leave.
Nevertheless, these harder-to-quantify costs have received considerably
more attention than the straightforward economic effects of the pro-

posed legislation, in spite of the legislation's ostensible focus on the welfare of women workers generally.
Protectionist legislation has, over the years, encompassed a very
See generally W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 63-106 (1987).
112. Id. at 96.
111.

113.
114.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 82-83.
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wide variety of governmental interventions in the workplace, including
many that are still with us today, such as wage and hour laws, 115

OSHA regulations, 11 and legal minimum wages. Professor KesslerHarris has argued that all forms of protectionist legislation are motivated by one of two goals. The first goal is improving worker health
and safety, which an inequality in bargaining power would not other-

wise accomplish.11 7 The second, more pernicious, goal Professor Kess-

ler-Harris identifies is to "reflect the prevailing sense of women's
proper roles.""18 by regulating the workplace and restricting the work
opportunities of female employees. Many protectionist laws aimed at
restricting women's employment opportunities rested on the notion that
women as a group required protection because of their unique reproductive role. As Professor Williams has noted, "[t]he legal distinctions

flowed from the central premise that men and women were destined for
separate social roles because of innate differences between them, most
centrally women's reproductive function.""'
This approach to workplace regulation, premised on immutable biological differences between men and women, gave rise to the "separate
spheres" doctrine, which held that men properly operated in the public
sphere, whereas women operated in the private sphere. Working
outside of the home was, itself, an attack on the notion of separate

spheres; restrictions were therefore necessary to limit the encroachment
of women into the public (i.e., male) sphere. 2 " Protectionist legislation
functioned to maintain these separate spheres for men and women and
to keep women out of the most public aspects of the public sphere. 2 '
115. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988) (minimum wage); 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988) (maximum hours).
116. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1901.1-1990.152
(1989); Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.1-2400.9
(1990).
117. See generally Hylton & Hylton, Rational Decisions and Regulation of Union Entry,
34 VILL. L. REV. 145, 152-59 (1989). Professor Kessler-Harris refers to these as "regulatory" laws
most commonly associated with the progressive period. A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A
HISTORY OF WAGE EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 180 (1982).
118. A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 117, at 181.
119. Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 333,
120. "[The separate spheres theory] considers men the natural breadwinners, lawmakers,
and warmakers; women, in contrast, are the natural homemakers, childrearers, and sex outlets. . . . [T]he public world of men is governed by law, while the private world of women is
outside the law." Note, Childbearingand Childrearing:Feminists and Reform, 73 VA. L. REV.
1145, 1151 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Childbearing].See also Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on
Women's Subordination and the Role of Law in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
121. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan classification of wives
and daughters of liquor establishment owners and wives and daughters of nonowners found rea-
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In addition, a number of states passed laws early in this century
that were ostensibly designed to protect pregnant workers, but actually
operated to the detriment of women. The laws required women to take
specified prenatal and postnatal leaves of absence, but failed to guarantee such workers' reinstatement, or any form of employment, once the
leave period expired.1 22 Moreover, a pregnant employee who took a
leave was generally unable to collect unemployment or disability insurance. The basis for the unemployment insurance disqualification was
the presumption that these women were not "able and available" for
work-a status required in order to collect unemployment. 12a Additionally, until Title VII was amended in 1978 by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 124 an employer was under no obligation to treat disability
due to pregnancy like any other disability. 2 5 Thus, many employers
simply fired employees who became pregnant.2 6 Others provided unpaid maternity leaves without any promise of job security, seniority retention, or continuation of benefits. Payment by employers of disability
benefits for childbirth was restricted, and employer-sponsored medical
sonable); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (state may protect women against
employment contracts which may leave them without adequate means of support or undermine
their health); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (references to "dependence" of women upon
men and the social need for "healthy mothers" justified working hours limits for women);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 142 (1873) (applicant unfit to practice law because
she was female) ("[I]n view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny and mission of woman, it is
within the province of the legislature to ordain what offices . . . shall be filled [only) . . . by men
122. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 240, MATERNITY PROTECTION OF
EMPLOYED WOMEN 7 (1952).
123. See MANPOWER ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INS. LAWS: COMPARISON REVISION, SERIES 2, No. 4 (Jan. 5, 1970). See also Turner v.
Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975); Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983); Connecticut Nat'l Org. for Women v. Peraro, 1980
WL 212 (D. Conn.) (consent decree forbidding state agencies from presumptively declaring
women who are recovering from delivery, who are breast feeding, or who have young children not
yet in child care, to be unable to work and thus ineligible for unemployment compensation); Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1985), cert. granted, 475 U.S.
1118 (1986), affd, 479 U.S. 511 (1987); Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 334.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
125. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
126. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discriminationon the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on
H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1977) (statement of Wendy W.
Williams, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center). Id. at 31 (statement of Susan
Deller Ross, Co-chair of the Campaign to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers).
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insurance provided limited coverage of pregnancy-related treatment
127
and hospital care.
By the early 1970s, however, women began to work outside the
home in larger and larger numbers in spite of continued occupational
segregation. Between 1950 and 1970, the labor force participation rate
for women with children under six years of age increased from 12% to
30%

12

a

By 1979, the rate was 56.1 %.129 As more and more women

left the private sphere for the public sphere, they encountered resistance to their full participation in the workplace, in the form of protective legislation. Subsequently, the separate spheres ideology came faceto-face with the adverse economic consequences created by its own attendant restrictions. As it became clear that restrictions and employer
policies informed by the separate spheres ideology had a detrimental
effect on women's workforce participation and economic well-being,
challenges emerged to the objectionable policy and its underlying rationale. For example, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as a lawyer, attacked discriminatory pregnancy policies with two aims in mind: first,
to strike down the mandatory leave policy; and, second, to gain legal
recognition that pregnancy was like any other disability and ought to
be accorded the same benefits under the employer's disability insurance
program. 3 0
The fight to dismantle the separate spheres doctrine was initially
limited to the traditional legal weapons available to challenge laws that
granted rights and privileges to one group and denied them to another. 13 1 Then, in 1971,
Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, then head of the Women's Bureau of the Department
of Labor, published an article in the New York Law Forum pointing out that
Title VII, state human relations laws, and the fourteenth amendment were weap-

127.
128.
(1971).
129.

Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 335.
WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 93
WOMEN'S BUREAU,

U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, PERSPECTIVES ON WORKING WOMEN: A

DATABOOK, TABLE 34 (1980).
130. See Note, Childbearing,supra note 120, at 1153-54.
131. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which
removed from legislatures the freedom to define women's roles in society, challenges to the separate spheres doctrine, see supra note 121 (cases cited), were decided on equal protection and
substantive due process grounds. In both types of cases, it was neither an infringement of women's
liberty rights nor a violation of their constitutionally guaranteed right to equal treatment under
the law for legislatures to adopt measures that disadvantaged women. For a discussion of the
evolution of equal protection analysis in constitutional law, see generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-25 to 16-30 (2d ed. 1988).
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ons for challenging disadvantageous employer pregnancy rules. She asserted optimistically that "it seems certain that the courts, after full consideration, will
adopt the obvious conclusion that pregnancy is a temporary disability and that
women are entitled to the same autonomy and economic benefits in dealing with
it that employees have in dealing with other temporary disabilities."'88

During the course of the litigation that ensued, two distinct theories developed for attacking separate spheres-inspired regulations. The
first argument was that women employees should ,be treated in the
same way as men employees and offered the same benefits of employment. This "equal treatment" approach required courts to first evaluate
a rule in light of the way in which it treated men. Then, it argued in
favor .of the same treatment for women on the grounds that anything
less was discrimination based on sex. 138
The second argument also focused on rules that tended to harm
women. The theory of discrimination, however, was not that women
were not receiving the same treatment as men; rather, a law or policy
was discriminatory if it tended to subordinate women, perhaps by failing to account for their unique reproductive role.
As Professor MacKinnon argued,
[N]ot all subordination lacks a basis in the social actuality of sex, and not all
sex-based irrationality produces systemic disadvantage. Sometimes, as has often
been the case for men, it produces positive advantages. What the second approach grasps, and the first [equal treatment] does not, is that it is not only lies
and blindness that have kept women down. It is as much the social creation of
differences, and transformation of differences into social advantages and disadvantages, upon which inequality can rationally be predicated. 84

Laws requiring disability leaves for pregnant employees have been
challenged by individuals on both sides of the special treatment/equal
treatment debate. 13 5 The equal treatment adherents argue that pregnancy should be treated like any other disability for purposes of employer-sponsored disability insurance. "[T]he objective is to readjust
the general rules for dealing with illness and disability to ensure that
the rules can fairly account for the whole range of workplace disabili132. Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 335-36.
133. Id. at 356.
134. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 105 (1979).
135. Of course, not all feminists can be classified as special treatment or equal treatment
supporters. Professor Mary Becker, for example, has argued that neither of these forms of equality analysis has the potential for significant change. See Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract
Equality, 5 SuP. CT. REV. 201 (1987); see also Littleton, Rethinking Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 1279 (1987).
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ties that confront employed people."' 18 6 As Professor Williams notes,
the goal of this approach is to "uncover commonality rather than differences" between men and women employees. 13 7 The problem, then, is
access to benefits, not the unique pregnancy function of
inadequate
88
women.3
Conversely, the special treatment adherents reject the notion that
pregnancy is comparable to other workplace disabilities. True equality
can only be achieved, they argue, by legal acknowledgement of the uniqueness of pregnancy. Failure to recognize that pregnancy is different
from other workplace disabilities only tends to "force pregnant women
into a workplace structure designed for men." This, in turn, "denies
women's special experience and does not adequately respond to the reality of women's lives. ' ' 80
B. Legal Attacks on "SeparateSpheres"
The equal treatment and special treatment approaches are best illustrated by examining several of the important challenges to separate
spheres-inspired regulations. The first cases, consolidated under Cleve40
involved constitutional challand Board of Education v. LaFleur,1
lenges to mandatory maternity leave policies that excluded pregnant
teachers from the classroom, even though they were willing and able to
work. The pregnant teachers in LaFleurwere required to take a maternity leave without pay, beginning five months before the expected date
136. Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 327.
137. Id. at 326.
138. Note that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which merely requires that an employer
treat disability due to pregnancy in the same way she treats any other disability, embodies the
equal treatment approach. Thus, an employer who promptly discharges an employee who becomes
disabled may also fire the disabled pregnant employee; both employees are receiving the same,
unfortunate treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981) ("[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes
• . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.
(emphasis added).
139. Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 327.
140. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The LaFleur opinion also resolved another case reported below
as Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). These cases were the first to be reviewed
on the merits. The Supreme Court had earlier denied review in one case involving a policy prohibiting pregnant women from working later than two months before the expected date of delivery.
See Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1107, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), and had vacated and remanded another case involving pregnant servicewomen. See Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 409 U.S. 947, vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
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of birth. A teacher on maternity leave was not promised re-employment
following delivery, but she was given priority in reassignment. Moreover, she was not allowed to resume teaching until the beginning of the
next regular school semester following the date upon which her child
attained the age of three months. In Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Board,"" the school required a teacher to leave work four
months prior to the expected date of birth; she was guaranteed reemployment at the beginning of the school year following the date on
which her doctor provided written certification that she was fit to work
if she could assure the school board that care of the child would cause
only minimal interference with her work." 2
The plaintiff challenged both policies on due process and equal
protection grounds." 8 The Supreme Court considered whether there
was a rational basis for the challenged policies that "unduly penalize[d] a female teacher [under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment] for deciding to bear a child."""' The Court determined
that the arbitrary employment cutoff and return dates for pregnant employees, with no individualized inquiry into a woman's ability to work,
impermissibly infringed on a woman's constitutionally guaranteed due
process right to bear a child." 5
In LaFleur, the Sixth Circuit had invalidated the School Board's
regulations on equal protection grounds and considered whether the
different treatment based on pregnancy was discrimination based on
sex. The Sixth Circuit found that the Board's classification impermissibly discriminated on the basis of sex because pregnancy was unique to
women. LaFleur struck a blow at the notion that pregnancy does not
properly belong in the public sphere and that women, especially pregnant women, should absent themselves as soon as possible and for as
long as possible from public life.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit, in Cohen, determined that dis46
crimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination."
141. 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974).
142. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 634-37.
143. LaFleur and Cohen were filed prior to March 24, 1972, the date on which Title VII
was extended to cover state agencies and educational institutions. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, amending former 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1,
2000e(b) (1981).'Both cases involved alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
144. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 648.
145. Id.
146. Cohen, 474 F.2d at 395.
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The Fourth Circuit raised the core equal treatment/special treatment
question when it asked: "How can the state deal with pregnancy and
maternity in terms of equality with paternity? It cannot, of course ...
Pregnancy and maternity are sui generis, and a governmental em1 47
ployer's notice of them is not an invidious classification by sex."
For the equal treatment adherents, equal protection analysis is an
effective, but limited, method for evaluating rules that are believed to
be discriminatory. The analysis is effective because it invites a direct
comparison of two similarly situated groups of employees-here, disabled male teachers and pregnant (disabled) female teachers. Its effectiveness is limited, however, because its usefulness depends on the
availability of a comparable group for comparison purposes. In LaFleur, the Sixth Circuit was willing to compare the treatment of disabled male and pregnant female teachers and to accept the notion that
pregnancy was merely a kind of disability. The Fourth Circuit in Cohen, however, was unwilling to compare male and female teachers because it could find no analogue for the pregnant female teachers.
In Geduldig v. Aiello,1 4 8 the Supreme Court evaluated a California disability plan that did not cover disability resulting from normal
pregnancy, but did provide compensation for a variety of other disabilities. The plaintiffs noted that the policy deprived them of disability
compensation as women disabled by pregnancy. This, they argued, was
discrimination based on sex; almost all other disabilities were covered
except the one disability that was unique to women-pregnancy.
The Supreme Court, employing equal protection analysis, determined that the appropriate classifications were not men and women,
but "pregnant women and nonpregnant persons." 1 9 Because the class
of nonpregnant persons included both men and women, the incidence of
harm was not strictly sex-based. Therefore, the plaintiffs had failed to
establish discrimination based on sex. The Court separated the treatment of female employees generally from that of pregnant employees
by noting that pregnancy was "an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics"1 5 that did not have any special significance for gender identity.15 1 The Court concluded by determining
147. Id. at 398.
148. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
149. Id. at 497 n.20.
150. Id. at 496 n.20.
151. Strimling, The Constitutionality of State Laws Providing Employment Leave for
Pregnancy: Rethinking Geduldig After Cal Fed, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 182 (1989).
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that there was a rational relation between the classification and the
state's interest in covering employees for some of the disabilities they
might experience.152 According to the Court, because there was no disability for which men were covered and women were not, and vice
versa, the challenged plan did not represent an impermissible classification based on sex. 15
As Professor Williams has noted, the distinction between due process and equal protection analyses strongly resembles the equal treatment/special treatment dichotomy. 54 Although imperfect, one might
say that due process analysis is linked with the special treatment approach; both evaluate pregnancy in terms of its unique impact on
women. In due process analysis the liberty interest at stake is the right
to bear a child without undue state interference, which the Court has
treated as a fundamental right. Equal protection analysis, on the other
hand, compares two groups and apportions benefits according to the
degree of commonality shared by the two groups. The emphasis in
equal protection analysis is on the similarity of pregnancy disability to
other disabilities.
In 1976 the Supreme Court decided General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 55 which involved a Title VII challenge to an employer's policy of
denying disability benefits to pregnant employees while continuing to
provide benefits to employees suffering from other short-term nonoccupational disabilities. Because the policy appeared to be facially neutral,
the Court evaluated the alleged violation in terms of its disparate impact on women. 56 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, relied on
Geduldig and determined that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
was not impermissible discrimination on the basis of sex. Because both
men and women employees were covered by the disability plan for disabilities common to both sexes, women were not deprived of any benefit
that men were able to receive. The Court noted that Title VII did not
require that "greater economic benefits . . .be paid to one sex or the
152.
153.
154.
155.

417 U.S. at 496.
Id. at 496-97.
Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 341.
429 U.S. 125 (1976).

156. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136-37. The Court noted that under Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), a plaintiff in a Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(2) (1981)) sex discrimina-

tion suit can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the effect of a given
policy is to discriminate invidiously. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. Here, however, the Court found that
the plaintiff had failed to meet her initial burden of showing discriminatory impact, and therefore
there was no discrimination.
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other because of their differing roles in the scheme of human
'5
existence.' 7
Gilbert is intriguing in terms of what it reveals about different
ways of viewing both equality and the special treatment/equal treatment debate. As Professor Williams has noted, Justice Rehnquist's
conclusion makes breathtakingly explicit the underlying philosophy of the majority of the justices in Geduldig and Gilbert. Pregnancy, for Rehnquist, is an "ex-

tra," an add-on to the basic male model for humanity. Equality does not contemplate handing out benefits for extras-indeed, to do so would be to grant special
benefits to women, possibly discriminating against men. The fact that men were
compensated under the program for disabilities unique to their sex troubled his
analysis not at all. 158

What Williams does not address is why pregnancy, aside from its
obvious uniqueness to .women, was viewed by the majority as an "extra." The possibility that one may be disabled by pregnancy is presumably well known to women who decide not to exercise their option to
terminate a pregnancy. One reason may be that, unlike other disabling
conditions, and because of the relatively liberal abortion laws in this
country, 15 9 pregnancy is viewed, at least as a matter of law, as optional.
As the so-called pro-choice forces would put it, women are legally free
to choose when and whether to remain pregnant, even if they do not
initially become pregnant by choice, as in the case of rape or incest. 160
Thus, unlike other short-term nonoccupational disabilities, pregnancy is
unique in that it is a potentially disabling condition that an employee
consciously and intentionally chooses. This characteristic, and not male
blindness about the similarity of pregnancy disability to other disabilities, may better explain the Rehnquist position. While it is beyond dispute that only women become pregnant, it is also true that the availability of abortion has, for most women, transformed pregnancy
157. 429 U.S. at 139 n.17.
158. See Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 345-46.
159. M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 112 (1987).
160. The existence of forced pregnancies should not be trivialized. Although the routine
medical practice of dispensing DES (Diethylstilbestrol, or, more colloquially, The Morning After
Pill) to rape and incest victims has made statistics on conception for. such victims virtually impossible to keep, the number of abortions performed each year due to rape and incest is approximately 14,000, or one percent of the 1.4 million abortions performed each year. Torres & Forrest,
Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 Fain. Plan. Persp. 169, 170 (July/Aug. 1988). The number

of women who conceive as a result of rape or incest, then, will be higher than the figures cited
above because some women will have taken DES and some, for moral or other reasons, will have
carried the pregnancy to term.
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disability from an unavoidable hazard for fertile women to a risk that
can be assumed or entirely eliminated.' 61
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,'1 2 in
which he invalidated an employer's policy of stripping women who returned from maternity leave of all pre-leave seniority, on the grounds
that it had a disparate impact on women employees in violation of Title
VII, also suggests that the Court may see pregnancy disability as a risk
the employee has willingly assumed. The majority focused on the fact
that the company policy stripped returning women of an accrued right.

Women who became pregnant and took a leave were subject to this
forfeiture whereas men were not. But, what the plaintiffs in Satty were
seeking was not a benefit that was triggered by or in any way related to
pregnancy, but one that was earned independent of their decision to
have a baby. Thus, Satty and Gilbert are consistent with a post-Roe"'

view of pregnancy disability that presumes each pregnancy is the result
of choice and therefore unlike other medical disabilities or benefits accrued prior to pregnancy. It may not be that Rehnquist sees pregnancy
as an "extra," but that, in light of the fact that employers are under no
64
federal obligation to provide any medical disability coverage at all,1
he distinguishes the chosen pregnancy from other (presumably nonoptional) medical conditions.
161. Obviously, if access to abortion was to be significantly restricted, as some have proposed, see, e.g., Nat'l Right to Life News, June 7, 1990, at 2, col. 1, this optional characteristic
would disappear. Ironically, it may be the choices created by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and its progeny that have undermined subsequent attempts to persuade the Court that disability
due to pregnancy is like other disabilities. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Planned Parenthood
of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). After all, as Professor Williams points out, many
of the covered disabilities in Gilbert were for conditions that almost always affect men, in the way
that pregnancy only affects women. Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 346. This
would suggest that something more than mere incidence explains the reluctance of the majority to
force employers to extend their disability coverage to pregnancy. See supra note 51. For a recent

update, see Lewin,

STRICT ANTI-ABORTION LAW SIGNED IN UTAH,

N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1991, at

A10, col. 4 (describing growing trend in many states toward limiting elective abortions).
162. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
163. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
164. Three states, Hawaii, New Jersey, and New York, mandate some form of employer
participation in employee disability insurance programs. New Jersey and New York require employers to make regular contributions, based on a percentage of each employee's salary, to a stateadministered disability plan, which disburses payments to employees. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-7
(West Supp. 1990); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1965). In Hawaii, where there is
no state-run plan, employers are required 'to secure disability coverage for their employees. HAW.
REV. STAT. § 392-41 (1985). In the event of employer insolvency, the state maintains a separate
fund to cover unprotected employees. HAW. REV. STAT. § 392-61 (1985).
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In 1978, in response to Gilbert, Congress enacted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA"), which prohibits employers from refusing
to cover pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions to the
same extent that they cover other medical disabilities. One obvious
drawback of the PDA is that it does nothing for women who are unemployed or whose employers simply choose not to provide coverage for
any medical disabilities.16 If the PDA is viewed as an example of the
equal treatment principle at work, it quickly demonstrates a shortcoming of the equal treatment approach: mere formal equality with male
employees may simply mean that both men and women are disadvantaged as in the case of an employer who offers no benefits other than
those minimal benefits mandated by federal and state law.
The PDA, as Professor Strimling has noted,166 "did not provide an
affirmative definition of gender equality." Therefore, it was unclear
how the Court would respond to an employer challenge to a California
statute that required employment leave for pregnant employees including a guarantee of reinstatement. In California Federal Savings &
Loan v. Guerra ("Cal Fed"), 67 an employer asserted that Title VII
preempted the California statute, which forced employers to be more
generous to pregnant employees than required by the PDA. The issue
was whether the PDA created a floor below which employers could not
sink, leaving states free to impose more stringent requirements.
Both special treatment and equal treatment advocates filed amicus
briefs. Representing the special treatment side were, inter alia, Equal
Rights Advocates, the California Teachers Association, the Northwest
Women's Law Center, and the San Francisco Women Lawyers Alliance. The American Civil Liberties Union, the League of Women Voters of the United States, the League of Women Voters of California,
the National Women's Political Caucus, and the Coal Employment
Project, among others, lined up on the side of equal treatment. According to the equal treatment adherents, there were two issues: First, are
legislative distinctions drawn on the basis of sex and pregnancy inherently dangerous even when they purport to confer advantages? Second,
given the history of sex discrimination, was the PDA adopted to create
165. The mandated parental leave contemplated by the Family and Medical Leave Act also
suffers from the same drawback: it offers nothing to women who cannot first obtain employment
with a covered employer.

166.

Strimling, supra note 151, at 189.

167.

479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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a strict equality standard to govern pregnancy-based distinctions? 168
The equal treatment supporters then went on to argue that the California statute rested on stereotypical assumptions and created invidious
distinctions which have historically reduced women's employment
opportunities. 169
The equal treatment proponents argued that, in general, protective
legislation reinforces sex-role stereotypes and is more harmful than
beneficial to women employees. They reminded the Court of its decision in Lochner v. New York 1' 0 and the "romantic paternalism" generated by the special treatment ideology.17 1 By forcing employers to treat
pregnant (i.e. female) employees differently, California was undermining women's employment status. "Protection is at best only ambiguously beneficial to women. Historical evidence reveals compellingly that
'
it has always carried . . .costs." 172
In contrast, the special treatment proponents saw the California
statute as an example of the kind of legislation they believed to be critical to compensate women employees for the special burdens imposed by
pregnancy and childbirth. The statute, they argued, promoted equality
by making up for the extra costs associated with pregnancy. The goal
was equal opportunity in the workplace, not identical treatment.17 Indeed, they argued that identical treatment would harm pregnant
women by failing to account for their special needs.
The Court ultimately sided with the special treatment interests
and determined that the California statute was consistent with the
PDA. The majority agreed that legal accommodation of biological difference is permissible when it has the effect of promoting equality between men and women and that this was both the goal and effect of the
74
statute.
As several feminist commentators have observed, one danger of
168.

Brief of American Civil Liberties Union at 10, 36, California Fed. Say. & Loan v.

Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494).
169. Id. at 11-23.
170. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

171. Brief of American Civil Liberties Union at 14 n.14, California Fed. Sav. & Loan v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494).
172. Id. at 22.
173. Brief of Equal Rights Advocates at 5-6, California Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 479
U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494).
174. 479 U.S. at 288-89 ("By 'taking pregnancy into account,' California's pregnancy disability-leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have families without losing their jobs."). Id.
at 289 (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
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analogizing pregnancy to other disabilities is that this has the effect of
preserving male characteristics as the norm. 175 Pregnancy, the argu-

ment goes, is only "unique" or "special" if men are the reference point
for determining what is unusual and what is typical. Preservation of the
male standard (whether for disabilities or anything else) will not help
to eradicate discrimination faced by women both in and outside of the
workplace. 176 What, then, should the point of reference be? With respect to pregnancy and pregnancy disability, identifying women as the
norm may not be very helpful because pregnancy and pregnancy disability are certainly not universally shared female characteristics. 7
Nevertheless, allowing California to force its employers to offer a
benefit to pregnant employees that they need not offer to other employees increases the likelihood that employers will develop a heightened

awareness of the possibility that female employees will require special
accommodation if they become, pregnant. Of course, this focus on
women employees is only unambiguously positive if it does 7not
result in
8
increased discrimination against women in the workplace.

175. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and Workplace
Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1152-59 (1986) ("The role of men in defining the standard of
normalcy and in assigning significance to female differences, means that the whole premise of our
equality jurisprudence is whatever is male is the norm.").
176. See, e.g., Scales, Towards A Feminist Jurisprudence,56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981). Professor Minow makes essentially the same point, only in broader terms, in her discussion of difference.
Finally, the version of reality that has for the most part prevailed in the entire culture gives
us. internal scripts about how to argue and, indeed, how to know. The dominant [male]
culture has established certain criteria for theories, for legal arguments, for scientific
proofs-that is, for authoritative discourse. Thus, the very ground rules for disputing which
version of reality should prevail .belong to the world view that has been dominant in the
past.
There is a strong connection between power and knowledge. If [women] want to make
a difference in existing arenas of power, it appears that we must take these established
criteria as the governing rules, even if they confine what we have to say or implicate us in
the patterns we claim to resist. For example, if we seek to be understood, let alone to
succeed, in a court of law, we must fit our claims into existing doctrine, even if that doctrine uses white middle class men as its reference point. [Footnote omitted] Yet by accepting the game as it is, we risk becoming tokens, taking our meanings and identities from
those who have let us in. . . . [T]o be counted by establishment institutions as theory,
feminist approaches must resemble the objects of their attack.
Minow, Foreword:Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 65-66 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
177. Again, this is especially true in the years since Roe v. Wade made abortions significantly easier to obtain.
178. Recently, the Supreme Court granted review of International Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace and Agric. Implant Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1990) (No. 89-1215), which involves an
employer fetal protection policy that is effectuated by excluding virtually all women from certain
positions. Johnson Controls may reignite the special treatment/equal treatment debate if the
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C. Special Treatment/Equal Treatment and Mandated Parental
Leave
Unlike the California statute in Cal Fed, which only special treatment proponents supported, the proposed Family and Medical Leave
Act has drawn considerable support both from those who see a need to
compensate for the special demands created by the need to care for
children and sick family members and from those on the equal treatment side of the debate.'7 9 The reason for unity over this issue appears
to be the language of the proposed statute, which guarantees the right
to a leave to both men and women. 80 Equal treatment adherents apparently accept at face value the notion that the proposed legislation
satisfies their equality requirement. Indeed, there has been remarkably
little opposition to the statute with the exception of the small-business
community, which appears to have no interest in dealing with difference and commonality, but worries instead about how the statute will
affect the costs of doing business. 8 '
That special treatment supporters like the bill is no surprise; that
equal treatment advocates have not questioned its wisdom on the
ground that, like the statute in Cal Fed, it may tend to reinforce stereotypes about women, is surprising. Perhaps this is because the statute
purports to deal with a problem that is not unique to one sex: how to
care for a needy family member. Experience with employer-provided
parenting leaves, however, strongly suggests that it will be women employees who take advantage of the unpaid leave option, whether the
Court agrees with the Seventh Circuit that employers may develop policies that are clearly
designed to avoid future exposure to liability for harm to unborn children, even if they have negative effects on women employees generally.
179. "We believe [passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act] is crucial because it is a
part of the necessary program to allow women to compete equally and fully in our paid labor
force." Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 925 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1987) (statement of Eleanor Smeal, President,
National Organization for Women).
"[I]t
is not only working mothers who suffer [the] consequences [of th6 lack of workplace
accommodation of family responsibilities]. Working fathers, too, find themselves risking their jobs
or their 'fast track' career standings if they must take time off, or even limit their overtime work,
for family responsibilities." Id. at 240. "[T]he FMLA would be an essential first step toward
meeting the needs and realities of American families today." Id. at 243 (statement of Donna
Lenhoff, Associate Director, Women's Legal Defense Fund).
.180. H.R. 770, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(4) (1990) ("The term 'employee' means any
individual employed by an employer.").
181. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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underlying care is for a newborn child or a sick, elderly parent.1 82
Thus, while it is true that either a man or a woman could take a leave
(satisfying demands for formal equality), the statute seems to have
been inspired by the perceived needs of working women. 188 It is reasonable to expect that employers will respond to the leave policy in the
way that equal treatment adherents believed employers would respond

to the policy at issue in Cal Fed-that is, by internalizing and reinforcing stereotypes about women based on assumptions about their role as
nurturers and caregivers.
That male employees could take advantage of the leave policy will
not mean much in terms of workplace equality if employer experience
suggests that they rarely do. Parental leave, then, may in practice function as a mandated child and family leave policy for women-hardly
desirable from an equal treatment point of view. The response to this
may be that the gender-neutral language of the statute will create an

incentive for men to increase their participation in caregiving. Maybe.
But experience under the employer-provided regimes does not suggest
1 84
that this is happening.
From a special treatment point of view, parenting leaves may
make sense if one is willing to ignore the strong possibility that this
benefit can only be obtained at the cost of intensified identification of
women with child and family care and the evidence suggesting that the
price may be paid in terms of decreased job opportunities for low-skill
women.

185

182. See supra note 6.
183. This is evidenced by the testimony of several of the House bill's cosponsors.
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987 addresses a fundamental shift in the
demographics of the American workforce and the American family. Between 1950 and
1985, the number of women in the labor force has increased by 178 percent. According to
the 1984 Census, the labor force was 44 percent female. More than 80 percent of working
women are in their prime childbearing years. Additionally, fewer than 10 percent of families are made up of a married couple with children where the husband is the sole provider.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service and the
Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Comm. on Post Office and
Civil Service, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gary L. Ackerman (Democrat,
N.Y.)).
[1) certainly am glad that this is a neutral bill because of the family issue, that is implied;
But the fact is that if you just take a look at where women are in the work force, you know
that about 80 percent of the 50 million women in the work force are [of] childbearing age,
and 93 percent of them are likely to become pregnant during their working lives. And that
is about 38 million American women.
Id. (statement of Rep. Mary Rose Oakar (Democrat, Ohio)).
184. See supra note 6.
185. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussion of the economic impact of
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Ultimately, the special treatment/equal treatment debate may offer little help in evaluating the Family and Medical Leave Act precisely because the focus of the debate in the employment context is
(and always has been) the best way to improve the lot of working
women vis-a-vis working men. This focus necessarily ignores the needs
of unemployed and under-employed women (and men) altogether. In so
doing, it fails to consider that, for the purposes of fashioning social and
economic policies, women are not homogeneous. What is good for some
women may be positively disastrous for others. 1 86 The woman who suffers increased stereotyping at work as a result of a special treatment
policy may nonetheless be better off than the woman who loses her job
altogether (or cannot obtain one) because a would-be employer prefers
to hire a man. Similarly, a high-skill female employee may well believe
that unpaid leave is a welcome benefit, and choose to ignore the possibility that it may reduce job opportunities for other women.1 87 Or an
equal treatment supporter may satisfy herself with the knowledge that
a man could avail himself of a leave if he wished to do so.
. In the end, for some women, it probably does not matter whether
the equal treatment or special treatment forces prevail in the employment arena. For, even though its terms suggest that its focus is the
well-being of all women, if you are a low-skill woman who cannot obtain or maintain employment, the debate is not about you anyway.
the proposed legislation).
186.

Professor Spelman has stated:

[I]t is crucial to sustain a lively regard for the variety of women's experiences. On the one
hand, what unifies women and justifies us in talking about the oppression of women is the
overwhelming evidence of the worldwide and historical subordination of women to men. On
the other, while it may be possible for us to speak about women in a general way, it also is
inevitable that any statement we make about women in some particular place at some
particular time is bound to suffer from ethnocentrism if we try to claim for it more generality than it has. . . . [T]he family may be the locus of oppression for white middle-class
women, but to claim that it is the locus of oppression for all women is to ignore the fact
that for Blacks in America the family has been a source of resistance against white
oppression.
E. SPELMAN,.supra note 52, at 131-32.
187.

For example, Professor Becker has noted that

[t]here are, however, a number of problems with . . . formal equality. First, formal equality tends to help most exceptional professional women, with the costs borne by another
group. The elite who lead the feminist movement should be reluctant to press for change
they consider desirable by imposing its costs on other women.
Becker, supra note 135, at 235.
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CONCLUSION

I have argued that certain social policies, particularly parental
leaves, are clearly a source of increased labor costs to employers, although the size of the increase is unclear. In the case of parental leaves
there is every reason to believe that the increased costs will be borne
primarily by low-skill female employees-those least likely to be able
to take advantage of the legislation.
Social policies such as unpaid parental leave that are not coupled
with counterbalancing employment policies aimed at increasing demand for relatively unskilled labor only exacerbate the various social
and economic woes suffered by the unemployed and the working poor.
In the same way that raising the minimum wage in the absence of comprehensive full-employment policies only serves to further reduce the
employment prospects of low-skill workers, the current parental leave
proposals purport to confer a benefit on working parents without adequate concern for the attendant loss in jobs.
In spite of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, unemployment compensation, and other forms of welfare, there can be little
question but that the costs of unemployment or underemployment are
not borne exclusively by those most directly affected. Indeed, the nexus
between high rates of unemployment and violent crime is well established and obviously affects us all.
Isolated policies, even those supported by the broad coalition backing parental leave, which are likely to lead to further economic
marginalization of the poor, ought to be rejected outright as ill-conceived and unjust. As interesting as some may find the "formal equality" versus "special treatment" debate, neither approach succeeds in
justifying parental leaves in the face of the evidence developed here.
The harsh day-to-day realities of unemployment or underemployment
are unlikely to be mitigated by the satisfaction of knowing that, for
example, maternity leave is being referred to as "parenting" leave in
order to promote formal equality and, maybe, to create an illusion that
will somehow cause increased numbers of men to participate in child
care.
The interests and concerns of women employees are not congruent
in most, or even many, respects. That so many middle class women's
organizations support parental leave is yet another example of classspecific, intra-group economic interests dominating a discussion that is
always characterized in broad, non-class-specific terms. This situation
is reminiscent of the contrast between the renewed activism surround-
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ing the abortion debate that sprung up after the Webster decision and
the relative silence following Harris.
That individuals pursue class-specific interests is neither surprising
nor particularly alarming. What it does suggest, however, is the importance of objective evaluation of proposed social programs. That organized women are in favor of a particular piece of legislation is no guarantee that some (maybe even large numbers of) women would not be
better off under other circumstances. 188 Parental leave legislation without a meaningful employment policy is not likely to enhance the status
or to promote the welfare of poor women. That middle class men and
women favor such legislation does not affect the validity of this conclusion. Indeed, it merely suggests that poor women lack either access to
or a voice with which to influence the lobbying efforts of their relatively
more affluent sisters.
188.

See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 10, 1990, at A32, col. 1.'

